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Tortured Logic: Why Attempting to Punish the
Authors of the “Torture Memo” Is
Unprecedented and Unjustified
by Catharine Richmond*

W

I. Introduction

ho tortured prisoners captured in the Iraq war? Reasonable guesses might include members of the military, prison guards, or CIA operatives. Some might argue even the
President himself, in his roles as Commander-in-Chief and Chief
Executive, is ultimately the person who should bear responsibility.
Most guesses, however, would probably not include lawyers from
the Office of Legal Counsel, which, until very recently, was a relatively obscure office in the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) known
as the “OLC.” Human rights accusations leveled against the Bush
Administration for its conduct of the Iraq war have now brought the
OLC out of obscurity.1 These accusations cast a spotlight on OLC
lawyers who authored a memorandum meant to provide “top secret”
attorney-client privileged answers to questions posed by their client,
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1

See Stephen Gillers, The Torture Memo, The Nation, Apr. 9, 2008, at 1;
see also Dana Preist & R. Jeffery Smith, Memo Offered Justification for
Use of Torture, Wash. Post, June 8, 2004, at A1.
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the CIA, concerning the legality of certain interrogation techniques.2
3
As these OLC lawyers are increasingly threatened with personal
consequences for the interrogation techniques used by their client,
the CIA, a question arises: to what degree should the OLC lawyers
be held accountable for the advice they gave their client in a memo?
While OLC lawyers must adhere to certain ethical and legal
standards, they should not be held accountable for the actions of
their client, the CIA, if the advice they gave was legally justified.
Nevertheless, public outcry has raised the issue of what possible
grounds exist to hold the OLC lawyers accountable for interrogation techniques used by the CIA.4 At least five grounds have been
advanced on which possible punishment for the OLC lawyers could
be considered.
First, and most logically, the CIA, as a client, could allege legal malpractice against the OLC lawyers, essentially claiming the
OLC lawyers acted unreasonably in providing their legal advice.
Although this would be the normal approach for holding lawyers
accountable for legal advice provided to clients, this remedy has not
been sought, first, because the CIA is presumably not dissatisfied
with the advice it received from the OLC, and second, because of

2

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Legal Counsel, Memorandum for John Rizzo,
Acting General Counsel of the Cent. Intell. Agency (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_08012002_bybee.pdf (hereinafter cited as “Torture Memo”).

3

There are several memoranda that are often, and incorrectly, referred to
as the “Torture Memo.” This paper will address only the August 1, 2002
memo from the OLC to the CIA’s acting general counsel John Rizzo,
id., as it was the only memo that was directly addressed to the CIA. The
context for the claims and accusations against the lawyers is based on the
attorney-client relationship between the OLC and CIA. As such, this particular memo best represents the communications within that relationship.

4

Dana Priest, Justice Dept. Memo Says Torture “May Be Justified,” Wash.
Post, June 13, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A38894-2004Jun13.html; Peter Murtagh, Inside the U.S.
Torture Machine, The Irish Times, Apr. 25, 2009, at 1, available at http://
www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/weekend/2009/0425/1224245355009.
html.
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procedural complications inherent in potential malpractice claims
between two parts of the Executive Branch.
Second, the District of Columbia Bar, or some other appropriate
state bar, could attempt to discipline or disbar the OLC lawyers on
grounds they had violated ethical rules, such as the rules requiring the
application of skill and care to attorneys’ work. Such complaints have
been filed against both Jay Bybee and John Yoo, who are the signatory and principal author of the so-called “Torture Memo,” respectively.
Third, one of the OLC lawyers, Jay Bybee, who was subsequently appointed to a federal judgeship, could possibly face impeachment.5 There have already been public calls for impeachment,
although no formal congressional action has been taken as of yet.
Fourth, the enemy combatants on whom the interrogation techniques were used could try to file lawsuits claiming damages for
violation of their constitutional rights against OLC lawyers as individuals. This kind of litigation has already been initiated against Yoo.
Fifth, the U.S. Attorney General could try to prosecute the lawyers for participating in a conspiracy to torture prisoners. Public
calls for such criminal charges have already been made.
Following a background section and a section about responsibility, this Note will examine each of these five potential bases for
punishment, and will end with a discussion of what action, if any,
is appropriate given the circumstances. For the sake of clarity and
convenience, a diagram appears at the end of this Note, depicting
the interrelationships among the various branches and offices of the
federal government and the five potential bases for punishment.

II. Background
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the President
committed “every tool of intelligence” toward “the destruction and

5

Calitics, Torture Memo: Impeach Judge Bybee, http://www.calitics.com/
diary/8575/torture-memos-impeach-judge-bybee (Apr. 17, 2009).
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to the defeat of the global terror network.”6 In the following months,
the CIA captured enemy combatants associated with terrorist activities. The CIA asked the U.S. Attorney General for legal advice
about certain enhanced interrogation techniques it wanted to use on
particular Al Qaeda combatants. The Attorney General delegated
the responsibility of responding to the request to the OLC, which is
an office in the Department of Justice that answers legal questions
arising within the Executive Branch.7 The OLC prepared a memo
within a few days of the request and submitted it to the CIA in August 2002. The memo, which was written by OLC lawyer John Yoo,
was signed by the head of OLC at the time, Jay Bybee.8 Although
there were subsequent OLC memos on the same or similar subjects,
this particular memo has come to be known as the “Torture Memo”
and is the focus of this Note. The label “Torture Memo” is, of course,
prejudicial, but nonetheless widely accepted. The Torture Memo was
released to the public in early 2009.

III. Attorney-Client Privilege Issue and Determining Responsibility

The release of the Torture Memo, and subsequent memos on the
same subject, raises interesting questions itself. According to attorney-client privilege law, a client, but not the attorney, has the right
to release its own confidential materials. As a client, the Executive
Branch (which the CIA is a part of) was the holder of this privilege,
and could decide to waive the privilege that would have otherwise

6

Address of President Bush Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the
United States: Response to the Terrorist Attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Pub.
Papers 1140, 1142 (Sept. 20, 2001) (reporting the president’s answer to
his rhetorical question, “how will we fight and win this war” on terror?).

7

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/olc/ (last visited Nov. 30,
2009).

8

Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 18.
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shielded the Torture Memo from public scrutiny.9 However, those
same attorney-client privilege rules, at least as applied in a litigation
setting, generally prohibit selective waiver; that is, the client cannot selectively reveal as a “sword” those privileged communications
which favor the client, while continuing to “shield” those communications which are not favorable.10 Under these rules, the entirety of
the OLC’s work, along with the CIA’s and White House’s work, on
wartime interrogation arguably should have been released as well.11
12
This attorney-client privilege issue is not the focus of this Note, but
it provides important context because without the disclosure of the
Torture Memo, the OLC lawyers never would have been subjected
to the considerable public criticism they have received; without the
criticism, the possibility of punishments probably would never have
been raised.
In addition to the questionable release of the Torture Memo, the
choice of who to punish for wartime interrogation techniques appears arbitrary. The Wall Street Journal reported that “Mr. Obama
drew a distinction between those who carried out the interrogations
and those who argued for them, reiterating that he didn’t think those
9

Barry M. Sabin & Matthew R. Lewis, Protection of the Attorney-Client
Privilege in Criminal Investigations, 8 Sedona Conf. J. 105 (2007) (discussing issues regarding the Department of Justice Criminal Division).

10

Dalen v. Ozite Corp., 594 N.E.2d 1365, 1370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Nguyen
v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 1999); Piedmont Resolutions
L.L.C. v. Johnston, Rivlin & Foley, No. Civ. A. 96-1605, 1997 WL 16071,
at 2 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 1997) (disclosing information in a manner that is
inconsistent with confidentiality waives privilege).

11

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d at 182; accord von Bulow, 828
F.2d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d
1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing “fairness considerations” that arise
when clients attempt to selectively waive the attorney-client privilege with
respect to certain documents so that they can use them as “swords,” while
declining to waive the privilege for other documents to “shield” them
from disclosure).

12

The White House, CIA, and OLC would be obligated to release their work
because they are all part of the Executive Branch. However, it is possible
that protective motions could be filed in an attempt to prevent the release
of certain documents if the issue was raised in a litigation context.
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who followed legal guidance should be prosecuted.”13 As a result,
the CIA was prematurely absolved from any wrongdoing. A subsequent report by the CIA Inspector General showed, however, that the
CIA, without the approval of the OLC, greatly increased the degree
of severity of the interrogation techniques originally approved by
the OLC.14 15 If someone will suffer consequences for the use of the
enhanced interrogation techniques, it seems recently revealed information, like the Inspector General’s report, should be considered in
determining who is responsible and who should be punished.
Nevertheless, the OLC lawyers still face the possible consequences of a malpractice suit, disbarment, impeachment, civil litigation, or criminal charges. Each of these possible punishments is
considered in turn.

13

Jonathan Weisman, Probes of Bush Officials Loom, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 22, 2009, at 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB124033320765839635.html.

14

Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, Special Review,
1-7, 24, 25, 37, 42, 43, 44 (May 7, 2004) (admitting that the CIA’s Inspector General’s “review of the [interrogation] videotapes revealed that the
waterboarding technique applied at [REDACTED] was different from the
techniques as described in the DOJ opinion and used in SERE [military]
training . . .. One of the psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the
Agency’s use of the technique differed from that used in SERE training
. . ..” This acknowledgement came after members of the CIA repeatedly
denied the OLC was unaware of the increase in severity of the interrogation techniques (23, 24, 36)).

15

Id. In addition, the Inspector General’s report states: “individuals interviewed during the Review identified other techniques that caused concern
because the DOJ had not specifically approved them . . .. For all of the
instances, the allegations were disputed or too ambiguous to reach any
authoritative determination regarding the facts. Thus, although these
allegations are illustrative of the nature of concerns held by individuals
associated with the CTC Program . . . they did not warrant separate investigations or administrative action.”
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IV. Argument
A. Legal Malpractice Liability
The first, and most natural, consequence that might flow from
the OLC lawyers offering legal advice to their client is a legal malpractice suit. A malpractice suit is a lawsuit a client files against its
lawyer alleging professional misconduct; allegations of misconduct
usually arise from negligence or inattention, but occasionally result
from incompetence. Legal malpractice suits are not generally used
in a government context and are typically limited to private litigation; nonetheless, as a technical matter, the CIA as a client could
consider alleging legal malpractice against its legal advisors, the
OLC attorneys. It is important to review the possibility of a malpractice suit for two reasons: (1) it is the most recognized way in which
clients seek redress from their lawyers for bad legal advice, and (2)
it highlights the difficulties inherent in applying other, more tenuous
forms of punishment against the OLC lawyers.
A malpractice suit must first begin with a dissatisfied client.
However, as far as it is known, the CIA has no complaints about the
advice it received from the OLC with respect to the use of enhanced
interrogation techniques. With a satisfied client, there is normally
no further consideration given to the confidential and privileged advice provided by attorneys. The CIA asked for legal advice, received
it, and presumably was satisfied. No other person beyond the client
asked for the advice, received it, or acted on it. To the extent anyone
was or is dissatisfied with what the CIA did with the advice, the focus of the dissatisfaction should be on the client, not on the lawyer.
Although there is no evidence of a dissatisfied client, public outcry
suggests that an analysis of whether malpractice was committed is
nevertheless warranted.
The rules governing malpractice suits are determined state by
state. Since the OLC lawyers worked at the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in Washington, D.C., malpractice statutory law in the District
of Columbia applies. According to D.C. attorney-client law, Article 45, Section 107, “an informed professional judgment made with
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reasonable care and skill cannot be the basis of a legal malpractice
claim.”16 That is, even if the CIA was a dissatisfied client, a malpractice suit could not be brought against the OLC lawyers simply
because their client did not like the professional advice the lawyers
provided. The CIA, as client, would have to demonstrate that the
attorney acted unreasonably or incompetently; if the attorney acted
competently with skill and care, there would be no claim.17
Attorneys are obligated to properly and competently research
their clients’ issues. This includes doing enough research to author
“well-founded opinions.”18 Especially if a body of law is unsettled
with respect to a particular issue (i.e., it is an area of confusion), an
attorney has a responsibility to research the applicable body of law
before offering the client advice.19 Here, the area of law the OLC lawyers were asked to examine is not a clearly developed body of law;
as recognized by a commentator in the Santa Clara Law Review, “a
true definition of what constitutes ‘torture’ under international law
has yet to be determined.”20 Although determining whether or not
a written legal analysis is well researched is somewhat subjective,
there are several strong indicators that the Torture Memo was well
researched. To start, the Torture Memo referenced several existing
treaties and laws on torture.21 In addition, the treaties and laws referenced were not obscure, nascent documents; they were widely recognized as the determining body of law, however minimal, on torture
at that time.22 Also, the Torture Memo’s advice was not arbitrary
16

D.C. Code Ann. § 45-107 (2009).

17

Id.

18

Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349 (1975).

19

Id.

20

Julianne Harper, Defining Torture: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric
and Reality, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 893, 895 (2009).

21

Torture Memo, supra note 2 at 15-18 (listing the following as evidentiary
support for their position: 8 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A; Torture: Victim
Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S.
255, 267 (2000); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991); Tenn.
v. Reise, 218 F.3d 518, 531 (4th Cir. 2002)).

22

Id.
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or haphazard. The law was applied, as best it could be determined
by the authoring individuals, to a precise set of facts supplied by
the CIA. This application of law resulted in “an informed opinion.”
There is nothing that prevents lawyers from offering their clients
informed opinions, despite the fact that those opinions may be based
on murky or undeveloped law. Hence, lawyers can give opinions in
areas of law that are not fully developed as long as they act in good
faith and apply skill and care to their work.
This is important. Legally, the Torture Memo was not required
to be perfectly substantiated and entirely correct—it was only required to be good enough. As the commentator in the North Dakota
Law Review recognized, “an attorney is not an insurer of a good
result. Nor is he the insurer of his opinions. Application of the standard of care to an attorney’s conduct does not require perfect results.
A non-negligent mistake or error in judgment in an area which is
subject to dispute does not create liability.”23 Although lawyers must
give “informed professional judgment[s],” which were “made with
reasonable care and skill,” perfection is not required.24 Attorneys
must apply skill and care “as a prudent man would exercise or use
under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs.”25 “By
definition, reasonable skill does not mean that the highest degree
of skill and care must be exercised;” it only means the median skill
level of all attorneys must be applied.26
Although it could be argued that attorneys should be held to
the highest professional standard possible, demanding such a high
standard would create a discrepancy between the realistic results an
attorney can be expected to produce and an idealized standard of
work, not readily attainable. The result is that if the median level of
care and skill are applied, “a decision made in an area of confusion,
if made in good faith, will probably not result in the attorney being
23

Franklin D. Houser, Legal Malpractice—An Overview, 55 N.D. L. Rev.
185, 196 (1979).

24

American Bar Association, Rules of Professional Conduct, Canon 6
(1980).

25

15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (2009).

26

Houser, supra note 23, at 196.
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held responsible.”27 Thus, the authors of the Torture Memo were not
expected to produce perfect results; they were only expected to act
with reasonable skill and care such that they could provide an “informed professional judgment.”28
There are some who allege that the OLC lawyers acted without care or skill. H. Marshall Jarrett, counsel for the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), explained that in
addition to whatever was required by District of Columbia law, his
office would also be “examining whether the legal advice in these
memoranda was consistent with the professional standards that apply
to Department of Justice attorneys.”29 The OPR’s report was released
early in 2010, after nearly seven years of investigation.30 The report,
which was changed several times, initially concluded that both Bybee
and Yoo committed professional misconduct.31 32 After reviewing the
OPR report, however, the Deputy Attorney General’s office rejected
the report’s conclusions, finding the OLC lawyers committed no

27

Id. at 198.

28

D.C. Code Ann. § 45-107 (2009).

29

Gillers, supra note 1, at 1.

30

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Prof. Resp., Final Report, (Jul. 29, 2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.
pdf.

31

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Prof. Resp., Report (Feb. 20, 2009), available
at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRSecondReport09.pdf; see
also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Prof. Resp., Report (Dec. 22, 2008), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFirstReport081222.
pdf.

32

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Prof. Resp., Report at 400 (Jul. 29, 2009),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf.
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misconduct and that no discipline was warranted.33 34 This internal
DOJ finding effectively negated OPR’s conclusions and exonerated
the lawyers of misconduct by their own Department’s standards.
While the OPR’s report, and its subsequent rejection by the DOJ,
is significant, it does not alter the CIA’s legal rights to any malpractice claim against its lawyers. The OPR’s findings on this matter are
only one of several authorities to which the courts would look in
deciding whether malpractice was committed. If the CIA wanted to
assert malpractice, it could still rely on the other authorities to do so.
While a malpractice claim is theoretically possible, it seems
unlikely. Although a malpractice suit seems to be the most appropriate and natural consequence flowing from advice received by a
dissatisfied client, assuming there was one, it is unclear how one executive department of the federal government could effectively pursue a malpractice claim against another. The President is expected
to settle disputes within the Executive Branch; internal Executive
Branch disagreements are sometimes aired in the press, but not in
the courts. It is difficult to see how the CIA could pursue a court case
leading to an award of damages against the OLC lawyers as it would
simply result in the reallocation of the federal budget. Apart from being unprecedented, the CIA has never expressed dissatisfaction with
its lawyers’ advice. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the CIA would
pursue any type of malpractice claim.

33

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Leg. Affairs, Letter to the Honorable John
Conyers, Jr., (Feb. 19, 2010) (reporting that Assistant Attorney General
Ronald Weich reported to John Conyers, who is the Chair of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, that David Margolis from the Deputy Attorney General’s office did not support the conclusions of the OPR report),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Weich100219.pdf.

34

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum for
the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General, (Jan. 5, 2010)
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf.
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B. Bar Association Discipline
The second possible consequence that could result from the legal advice provided by the OLC lawyers is disciplinary action by
a state bar; such complaints have already been filed against Bybee
and Yoo.35 Each state has a bar association that regulates and disciplines lawyers in that state or, in this instance, the District of Columbia.36 Each bar is subject to its own rules and maintains complete
autonomy over controlling who is admitted to the bar and allowed to
practice law in that state. With potentially more severe consequences
than a malpractice suit, lawyers can be referred for discipline to the
bar under which they practice for various reasons including unethical behavior, misconduct, or incompetence.37 In this case, the OLC

35

Memorandum from Velvet Revolution to the Bd. on Prof’l Responsibility, D.C. Court of Appeals, Re: Complaint Against Jay S. Bybee (May 18,
2009) (available at http://votersforpeace.us/StateBarComplaints/Bybee_
complaint_1_VR-1.pdf); see also Memorandum from Velvet Revolution
to the Disciplinary Bd. of the Sup. Ct. of Pa., Re: Complaint Against John
Choon Yoo (May 18, 2009) (available at http://votersforpeace.us/StateBarComplaints/Yoo_Complaint_1_VR.pdf).

36

The American Bar Association, http://www.abanet.org/ (last visited Dec.
9, 2009).

37

Disciplinary action by a bar association could potentially be more severe
than a malpractice suit because a bar association can revoke or suspend a
lawyer’s license to practice law—this would render the lawyer ineligible
to practice law whereas a malpractice suit could result only in damages
against the lawyer, but leave him or her free to continue practicing.

Tortured Logic

177

lawyers, presumably, were members of the District of Columbia Bar
and hence would be subject to its requirements.38
With respect to unethical behavior, the D.C. Bar delineates seven
areas of unethical behavior that would constitute misconduct:
(a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do
so through the acts of another; (b) Commit a criminal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) Engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; (d) Engage in conduct that seriously interferes with
the administration of justice; (e) State or imply an ability
to influence improperly a government agency or official;
(f) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct
that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or
other law; or (g) Seek or threaten to seek criminal charges
or disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in a
civil matter.39
Putting aside other possible grounds, one area of relevance might be
found in section 8.4(c), which prohibits “dishonesty, fraud, deceit,

38

Relatively few lawyers are admitted to the D.C. Bar via successful
completion of the District of Columbia’s Bar Examination. The D.C. Bar
has a fairly lenient “waive-in” policy. That is, lawyers can take the bar
examination for a different state (say California or Massachusetts), and
if they pass with a sufficiently high score on the multi-state portion of
the examination, request to be “waived-in” to the D.C. Bar. If the OLC
lawyers were punished, or even disbarred, in the District of Columbia, this
would not necessarily result in discipline by the bar associations of other
states, even from those states from which they “waived-in” into the D.C.
Bar. However, discipline by the D.C. Bar could certainly be the basis for a
complaint to another bar association. Interestingly, it appears that Yoo has
had a bar complaint filed against him in Pennsylvania but not in D.C.

39

District of Colombia Bar Association, Rules of Professional Conduct §
8.4, (Feb. 1 2007), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/
legal_ethics_rules_of_professional_conduct/amended_rules/rule_eight/
rule08_04.cfm.
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or misrepresentation.”40 To implicate the OLC lawyers for acting
“dishonestly” or “fraudulently,” evidence would need to be discovered proving that the lawyers intended to mislead the CIA. Here,
the legal statutes and case law used in the Torture Memo both existed and were relevant.41 They were not misrepresented such that the
client was subject to dishonest or fraudulent information. Without
evidence, there can be no claim; and, as of yet, no such evidence
of dishonesty or fraudulence has been provided. Consequently, the
OLC lawyers should be cleared of being dishonest or fraudulent.
The question remains whether the lawyers were deceitful or
misrepresented their client or the law. The lawyers had an obligation not to be deceitful to their client—the CIA. The Torture Memo
was written in response to particular questions, based on a supplied
set of facts, to a specific client. The conclusions answered specific
questions. The OLC lawyers were not deceitful to their CIA client in
answering these questions according to the D.C. Bar’s rules. Public
commentary about the alleged deceitfulness of the Torture Memo’s
conclusions is irrelevant to the question of their defensibility from an
ethical standpoint. As explained by a National Review author, “some
types of treatment of prisoners, while perhaps not acceptable either
to the administration or to the American public, might nonetheless
be legally defensible under both international and American law.”42
The Torture Memo did not say whether the CIA should employ the
various means of interrogation; it only stated whether the CIA could

40

Id. at 8.4(c).

41

Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 15-18.

42

Byron York, A Tortured Debate: The Media-Fed Hysteria Over the Treatment of Terrorist Prisoners, National Review, Jul. 12, 2004, at 3.
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employ them, based on the available facts and legal authorities.43 It
was up to the CIA or the White House to decide whether the enhanced interrogation techniques, although legal in the OLC’s opinion, should actually be employed. Thus, despite how others may feel,
the OLC lawyers did not deceive their CIA client under the Bar’s
standards.
Another potential area the D.C. Bar could examine is whether
the OLC lawyers were incompetent. According to the D.C. Bar, “a
lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”44
More specifically,
In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite
knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors
include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the
matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question, the preparation
and study the lawyer is able to give the matter, and whether it
is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with,
a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.45
However, “a lawyer need not necessarily have special training or
prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the

43

Id. (In fact, the Torture Memo suggests that the CIA should have “the constant presence of personnel with medical training who have the authority
to stop the interrogation should it appear it is medically necessary [to do
so]; it is assumed that the waterboarding technique in question is the same
one ‘used in SERE training,’ which is standard U.S. military training; it
is also assumed, based on the CIA’s supplied set of facts, that the CIA
had “conducted the due diligence [and]… reviewed the relevant literature
on the subject and consulted with outside psychologist” in determining
whether the techniques would inflict prolonged mental harm.”).

44

District of Colombia Bar Association, § 1.1 (defining competence), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/rules_of_professional_conduct/amended_rules/rule_eight/rule01_01.cfm.

45

Id. at § 1.1.1.
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lawyer is unfamiliar.”46 Most important, the “competent handling of
a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual
and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners.”47
Were the OLC lawyers who authored the Torture Memo “incompetent” based on these standards, or did they act and perform in
a manner that demonstrated reasonable competence? There is little
dispute that the OLC lawyers were not recognized experts on torture. But lawyers are often not experts on the topic on which they
are offering advice. Moreover, the D.C. Bar does not expect lawyers
to be experts in order to be competent enough to give counsel on any
particular topic.48 What the D.C. Bar does expect is “inquiry into
and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and
use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent
practitioners.”49 If lawyers are not expected to be experts, but are expected only to demonstrate proper “inquiry and analysis” into a matter, did the OLC lawyers fulfill these requirements of competency?
The answer is found in the Torture Memo itself. The Torture Memo
is of significant length and discusses pertinent case law. It addresses
the applicable sections in Title 18 of the U.S. Code and the United
Nations’ Convention Against Torture.50 The analysis and commentary on these laws is specific and thorough. Even though the contents
of the Torture Memo are not universally agreed upon, the fact that
46
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American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility, Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.1, Comment 2 (2009) (explaining
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it was thoroughly researched and analyzed, even if only from one
given perspective, satisfies the requirement for competence.
That leaves the question whether the Torture Memo’s conclusions were otherwise appropriate. The conclusions did not have to
be “right” in the sense that there was only one correct way of answering the questions posed. In other words, legal reasoning is not a
science: it requires interpretation, which can lead to results that can
be both reasonable and different at the same time. Individual interpretation of the law is the bedrock of the legal system, and differing
opinions do not constitute incompetence. In his book, The Terror
Presidency, Jack Goldsmith, who succeeded Bybee as head of the
OLC and is now a political scholar at Harvard, criticized the Torture
Memo as being “legally flawed, tendentious in substance and tone,
and overbroad.”51 Yet even these accusations fail to substantively
demonstrate the OLC lawyers were incompetent. All they prove is
that Goldsmith disagrees with the conclusions; they do not prove that
the conclusions were outside the realm of reasonable conclusions. In
fact, in a later interview Goldsmith acknowledged,
I don’t impugn the integrity of anyone. I really do believe
that everyone . . . w[as] acting in good faith. . .. We were all
acting under intense pressure. . .. Therefore, we had to try as
hard as we could. . .. We all have our own views of the law
and how to approach the legal principles. And in some sense
it was a legal dispute.52
Thus, although there may be legitimate grounds to dispute the conclusions of the Torture Memo, those disputes are not sufficient evidence of incompetence on the part of the OLC lawyers.
Although it would be difficult to prove incompetence, a disciplinary investigation by the Bar is nonetheless a real possibility
as evidenced by the complaints that have already been filed. Had
the OPR’s report of gross professional misconduct under the DOJ’s
standards been accepted, the Bar may have more easily determined
51
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Daniel Klaidman, ‘The Law Required It,’ Newsweek, Sept. 8, 2007, at 4,
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that the lawyers also failed to satisfy the Bar’s standards. As previously mentioned, however, the Bar and the OPR have different standards—as a result, the lawyers could still be disciplined or disbarred
under the Bar’s different standards as described above.
C. Impeachment
The third possible consequence is the impeachment of Judge
Bybee, who signed off on the Torture Memo as the head of the OLC
at the time.53 President Bush appointed Jay Bybee to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2003.54 A federal
judgeship is an Article III lifetime appointment; to be removed from
this office a judge must be impeached by the House of Representatives and stand trial in the Senate.55 Article II, Section Four of
the United States Constitution establishes that “the President, Vice
President, and all other civil Officers of the United States shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors.”56 Judges
are rarely impeached, and when they are, their crimes are usually
gross in nature, such as taking bribes or committing other serious
felonies that would erode confidence in the judiciary.57 In over two
53
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hundred years, only thirteen federal judges have been impeached,
and of those only seven convicted.58
Considering that the only evidence against Judge Bybee is a government memorandum, and the subsequent seven-year analysis by
the OPR resulted in a finding of no misconduct and recommended no
discipline, the House would probably not have substantial grounds
to impeach him. To gain political cover, investigating House committees may wait until other legal action has been taken against
him, such as formal sanctioning or disbarment from the D.C. Bar.
While impeachment seems an extreme action to take against a judge
based on the contents of a memorandum written long before the
judge took the bench, the power of public outcry may nevertheless
prompt continued calls for the impeachment of Judge Bybee.59 Indeed, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, John Conyers, announced on February 19, 2010, that his committee would hold
hearings because, in his view, the OPR’s report and related materials
“make plain that those memos were legally flawed and fundamentally unsound, and may have been improperly influenced by a desire
to tell the Bush White House and the CIA what it wanted to hear.”60
Another member of that committee, Jerry Nadler, is already on record that Judge Bybee “ought to be impeached.”61
Thus, even though the Executive Branch, through the OPR, has
found no misconduct and no grounds for discipline, Congress remains
free to conduct hearings and, potentially, to impeach Judge Bybee.
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D. Civil Litigation
The fourth possible consequence could be a civil lawsuit filed
against the OLC lawyers, as individuals, alleging they purposefully violated the rights of detainees. Such a lawsuit has already been
filed; Jose Padilla, an accused terrorist, has sued Yoo for allegedly
violating his constitutional rights.62 The case was allowed to proceed
beyond a dismissal motion in a federal district court and is now on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit.63 64 In spite of the OPR’s open investigation at the time, the DOJ’s Civil Division filed an amicus brief on
behalf of Yoo in the Ninth Circuit as it had in the district court.65
Typically, government officials are immune from being sued as
individuals under the common law tradition of sovereign immunity
inherited from England. As it was adopted in American law, government officials are protected by qualified immunity. The qualified immunity granted to government officials in the United States provides
them with protection from being sued for damages as individuals,
but only insofar as they did not knowingly or willfully violate any
person’s constitutional rights. “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when
they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.”66 However, the Supreme Court has failed to adopt
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clear guidelines on qualified immunity, and “the result has been incoherent, inconsistent, and often counterintuitive decisions.”67
The first, and most significant, Supreme Court ruling on qualified immunity was nearly four decades ago in the Bivens case.68
In Bivens, the Supreme Court laid out a two-part test to determine
whether a remedy could be sought against government officials for
monetary damages: (1) whether alternative remedies existed, and (2)
whether there were “special factors” that should be considered.69 In
the 39 years since Bivens, the Supreme Court has narrowly extended
it only twice—once in a due process case and once in an Eighth
Amendment case.70 The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that
Congress is vested with the appropriate powers to address such matters.71 Especially “where there are special considerations or sensitivities raised by a particular context, the courts recognize that it is
appropriate for the courts to defer to Congress and wait for it to enact
a private damage action if it so chooses.”72
Padilla’s case should have been dismissed on both parts of the
Bivens test. First, alternative remedies existed. Padilla claimed he
was mistreated and illegally held in a Navy brig. Two days after
being taken into custody, Padilla filed for a writ of habeas corpus.73
67
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His writ was initially denied due to improper filing, but was later
declared moot anyways by the Supreme Court due to his relocation
to a federal prison.74 This clearly shows Padilla had a reasonable
and alternate legal remedy available to him. As the DOJ’s amicus
brief recognizes, “the fact that the habeas statute provides no damage remedy or redress against Yoo personally, is not a ground for
supplementing that remedy with a judicially-created money-damage
claim.”75 Apart from legal remedy, Padilla also could have reported
the lawyers to the Bar or the OPR, which others have already done.76
Second, there are numerous “special factors” involved in this
case. First, the potential limiting of the President’s war powers is
a critical factor weighing against permitting a suit against the OLC
lawyers. As the DOJ’s amicus brief points out, “there can be little
question that the claims here directly implicate war powers of the
President, with respect to the military’s detention and treatment of
those determined to be enemies during an armed conflict, that have
never been the subject of money-damages actions in our nation’s long
history.”77 In addition, “courts have traditionally been reluctant to
intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national
security affairs” because they are ill equipped to do so.78 The DOJ’s
amicus brief explains, “recognizing a Bivens action in this context is
especially inappropriate because the plaintiff is seeking to impose liability for legal advice relating to war powers and national security.”79
A second factor weighing against a private lawsuit is that allowing a Bivens action could influence foreign policy decision
making—Padilla’s designation as an enemy combatant influences
how future policy will be shaped in defining wartime enemies. “To
74
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determine whether drastic measures should be taken in matters of
foreign policy and national security is not the stuff of adjudication,
but of policymaking.”80
A third factor is that the military would be forced to turn over
sensitive information to the courts regarding wartime practices if the
case proceeds. This would endanger the security and usefulness of
information about current wartime military practices.
A fourth factor is the “threat . . . such claims could deter the invaluable, frank, and full discussion within the Executive Branch . . . [and]
the need for candid advice . . . is vital.” 81 As a commentator states:
Rather than fully devote themselves to counseling members of the Executive Branch, and aid in policymaking efforts, executive lawyers—who are frequently called upon to
grapple with activities that push the ill-defined boundaries
of illegality and constitutionality—will be preoccupied with
avoiding personal liability. Once the primary means of conveying legal concepts and advising others, the legal memoranda may instead be viewed as potentially incriminating
evidence. The prospect of litigation also chips away at the
confidentiality of executive legal advice—a cornerstone of
the legal profession.82
Apart from limiting presidential powers, the possibility of deterring
frank legal advice in the Executive Branch could be the most lasting
damaging effect of allowing private suits against the OLC lawyers.
Fifth, and finally, extending a Bivens remedy against Bybee and
Yoo would explore new areas of constitutional law. It has been long
recognized by the Supreme Court that “if there is one doctrine more
deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality
unless such adjudication is unavoidable.”83 More specifically, in ac80
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cordance with the constitutional avoidance doctrine, “the court will
not pass upon a constitutional question . . . if there is also present
some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”84
Although Padilla claims his constitutional rights were violated,
seeking a money-damages remedy through a Bivens action is not
the proper course to pursue. Potential threats to limiting presidential
wartime powers, unduly influencing foreign policy, revealing sensitive military information, limiting frank legal advice in the Executive Branch, and establishing new constitutional law are all factors
weighing against imposing civil damages on the OLC lawyers.
E. Criminal Charges
The fifth possible consequence could be criminal charges filed
against the OLC attorneys by the Attorney General or a U.S. Attorney alleging participation in a conspiracy. Such allegations have
already been made. Stephen Rohde of the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) recently suggested filing such charges in a public
Federalist Society debate with John Eastman.85 Rohde recommended the OLC lawyers be scrutinized under the same laws they used
to justify enhanced interrogation techniques for the CIA, which is
found in section 2340 of Title 18 in the U.S. Code. The Patriot Act
modified section 2340 to include anyone who conspires to commit a
crime be charged with the same penalties.86 If carefully read, however, the code states there must be “an act committed by a person”
which carries “the threat of imminent death” to constitute a violation; here, those who committed these alleged acts have already
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been absolved by the President.87 88 In addition, the code states that
“whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit
torture” will be charged under this section.89 It seems that the OLC
lawyers, who certainly did not commit an act of torture outside the
United States, could not be possibly charged as if they had. Rohde,
however, maintains that the Torture Memo was prepared as a cover
for conduct that was already occurring, and was the “lynch-pin” in
a conspiracy to commit torture.90 If the lawyers can be charged at
all, a “conspiracy” must first be proved to exist; as of yet, no such
conspiracy has been uncovered.
While conspiracy charges seem to be a remote possibility, the
public nature of their allegation suggests they could become more
likely in the future.

V. Appropriate Actions
If the above actions, namely a malpractice suit, Bar discipline,
impeachment, civil litigation, or criminal charges, are not the proper
actions to be taken, what are, if any?
First, it bears repeating that the Torture Memo was a privileged and confidential document prepared in an attorney-client relationship. All of the threatened consequences for the authors of the
Torture Memo have either been suggested by parties outside that relationship or have not been pursued by the client. Tellingly, the CIA
has never sought any remedy against the OLC—presumably because
the CIA was satisfied with the advice provided by the OLC lawyers.
Had the CIA been dissatisfied with the OLC, it could have raised
malpractice accusations or reported the lawyers to the Bar or OPR.
The continued pursuit of punishment for the OLC lawyers through
alternate methods suggests a desperate attempt of those outside the
87
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privileged attorney-client relationship to punish lawyers who gave
advice in a murky area of law under wartime pressures.
In addition to those possibilities, there have also been suggestions in the media and by members of Congress that congressional
hearings are in order.91 Had other remedies not been sought, this
might have been a legitimate option to pursue. In light of the extensive OPR report and possible Bar and judiciary action, however, it
seems redundant for Congress to initiate its own inquiry. It would
also waste government funds—the OPR has already spent valuable
funds investigating this matter for seven years. Those in the government who are responsible for maintaining ethics have already made
a substantial inquiry into this matter. The ultimate conclusion of that
inquiry was absolving for the OLC lawyers. Any further investigation would seem to be redundant and a waste of resources.

VI. Conclusion
The legal advice in the Torture Memo has been widely criticized,
and was even later rejected by the OLC itself.92 Although the client,
the CIA, was entirely satisfied with the OLC lawyers’ advice, it is
now clear that many government officials were not. Dissatisfaction
does not prove wrongdoing or incompetence, however. The subsequent criticism of the Torture Memo is similar to military historians
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who criticize decisions made in battles long ago—it is always easier
to see the flaws of others from a safe and retrospective distance.
Punishing the OLC lawyers would have significant consequences. If the lawyers are punished, there is a risk that every subsequent
administration’s lawyers could be aggressively pursued for perceived
problems with the administration’s policies. Legally, it would be establishing a dangerous precedent in which lawyers could be held accountable for the actions of their clients. Punishing the OLC lawyers
would set a precedent of false accountability. Lawyers would have to
live in fear of authoring any legal opinion, as they could potentially be
held accountable for any foreseeable or unforeseeable consequences
of their opinions, as implemented by their autonomous clients.93
The OLC does not establish or carry out executive policy. Instead, the OLC provides legal advice to its government clients,
which they are free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, as they
see fit. The OLC is not, and should not be, responsible for the morality of actions the government takes based on its legal advice if the
advice was legally justified. Authoring the Torture Memo and implementing its advice are two separate issues. Although the lawyers
may have provided a legal justification for what some believe to be
torture, they in no way endorsed it. Pursuing punishment for lawyers
who have authored legal opinions in good faith is a dangerous precedent to set, especially at the federal level.
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